

4 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT : I&W Study

1. Attached is a draft outline for the paper we are to produce. I would like to be able to settle on this at our meeting next week (Tuesday, 9 May, at 2:00 p.m. in Room 7E62). At that time we should also assign drafting responsibilities in the hope we will be able to start discussion and review of drafts a week later. If possible, please reserve time on your schedules for meetings every afternoon 16-19 May beginning at 2:00 p.m. This is tentative; I will not take more of your time than necessary, but we have to determine as quickly as possible where our problems lie. We can discuss on Tuesday whether a subdivision into smaller working groups will ease the process.

2. Attached also is a draft provided by Vince Heyman on DCI responsibility to military commanders. I will send around the other papers requested at our first meeting as they are received.

3. In addition to the outline, I would like Tuesday to discuss:

- Who should be in charge under the DCI?
(IIC1a in Outline)
- Is some sort of permanent DCI Committee desirable? If so, with what terms of reference? (IIC1b)
- How does the DCI convey (small-w) warning?
(IIC2a-c)



Richard Lehman
Associate Director - Substantive Support
National Foreign Assessment Center

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Attachments

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I. Background

A. History of Warning in Community

1. Watch Committee/NIC
2. Internal CIA staff arrangements
3. Change to Special Assistant/SWS
4. WISP

B. Evolution of community watch centers

1. Development in CIA
2. Elsewhere in Community (including WH)
3. Role in warning

C. Arrangements for crisis management (over time)

1. Task force & situation report
2. Role of NIO
3. National Task Force experiment
4. Present confusion - need to reflect NITC

D. Major (and perennial) issues

1. Relationship fo warning to current intelligence
2. Big-W vs. Little-W
3. DCI's responsibilities vs. those of Secretary of Defense
(in warning and intelligence crisis management only)
4. DCI's responsibilities to field commands

E. Converging requirements

1. I&W Seminar -
2. exercise - Carlucci letter
3. WISP
4. HPSCI and OMB

II. Discussion

A. Definitions and DCI responsibilities (conceptual framework)

1. Current intelligence
2. Little-W
3. Big-W
4. Crisis management (including relations to I&W)

B. Criteria for a National System

1. Clear lines of responsibility under the DCI
2. Smooth transition from normal operations to crisis
3. Line responsibility for warning, balanced by effective second-look mechanisms
4. DCI control over mechanisms directly supporting him, balanced by a recognition of Community equities (especially in strategic warning).
5. Protection of national intelligence assets supporting NSC from premature subordination to NCA and war-fighting

C. Necessary elements of such a system:

1. Management
 - a. Line of command under DCI
 - b. Community oversight and coordination
 - c. Internal staffing under DCI
2. Arrangements for warning
 - a. First-look
 - b. Second-look
 - c. Dissemination
 - d. Collection tasking
3. Additional arrangements for strategic warning
 - a. Second-look

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- b. Dissemination
- c. Collection tasking
- 4. Arrangements for crisis management
 - a. Policy support
 - b. Analysis
 - c. Dissemination
 - d. Collection tasking

III. Recommendations (or Options?)

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DCI SUPPORT TO U.S. MILITARY
FIELD COMMANDERS

OVERVIEW:

The DCI's responsibility for providing national intelligence to the President and the NSC is well established, agreed upon and reflected in DCI procedures and deployment of resources. This intelligence support is also selectively available to other senior U.S. officials in Washington. The degree to which this kind of support is made available either directly or through their parent organizations to senior U.S. official representatives abroad, especially U.S. military field commanders is not well established but clearly should be, especially in areas like Europe/Middle East (USCINCEUR) and Korea where serious crisis and warning issues are ever present. The U.S. military field commanders there constitute another primary customer for national intelligence and any DCI statement of I&W or crisis management responsibilities or the establishment of DCI mechanism should reflect the reality of this responsibility.

The broadening of the DCI's authority in the recent Executive Order, specifically the creation of the NITC, plus the DCI's responsibility to insure proper distribution of information collected and produced makes the manifestation of his responsibilities vis-a-vis the "CINCs" even more necessary than previously. Also the recent studies on the subject of national/tactical interface indicate the urgent need for these elements of the Community to work toward the development of more interactive and mutually supportive arrangements.

PROCEDURAL/ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS:

The nature of any enhanced DCI national intelligence support to the CINCs has a number of facets requiring attention. One of the major issues is reporting both the what and the how:

--currently the provision of finished national intelligence to them is sporadic; some (Gen. Haig) get practically all that is available concerning these areas: others CINCSAC-CINCPAC and the U.S. component of Gen. Haig's command receive considerably less. The presence of a CIA substantive officer assigned to a command is a major factor in this connection. Some serious effort to rationalize this situation must be undertaken to protect the DCI from criticism;

--currently the provisions of collected, unfinished national intelligence also lack uniformity. Imagery reporting out of NPIC is wide spread and responsive and goes directly to the commands: Sigint support likewise is broad in coverage and goes directly to the Commands. CIA/DDO Humint field reporting goes both ways: a very small amount goes to the CINCs on an "EXCLUSIVE FOR" named recipients basis, but most goes via the DDO/DIA arranged MILDIS system which is not viewed as satisfactory by the CINCs, mainly because the distribution is limited to military subjects, as determined by the individual DDO divisions in Washington.

The other major aspect of the DCI's support to the CINCs is organization, i.e., the establishment of DCI representatives at the major field commands and a responsive community wide supportive or coordinating counterpart.

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I&W AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT ISSUES:

If we can assume an enhanced recognition of the need to manifest the DCI's support to the major U.S. military commanders, and given the improvements in the DCI's procedural and organizational arrangements discussed earlier, his ability to deal with I&W and crisis management issues at the CINC level should then exist. It would lack only the conceptual basis of what kinds of "warning" related data is involved and via which DCI Washington based mechanisms, i.e., the SWS, an enhanced SWS, a WISP like arrangement or something entirely new. Clearly, and mainly on political grounds, the DCI must have at least "a dummy in the window" (hopefully a lively one) if he is to be perceived as the President's senior intelligence official in all respects, including warning and crisis management.

Vincent J. Heyman

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